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Abstract
We consider the presence of first-mover advantage or disadvantage in a duopoly
model of product positioning. Firms in our model are symmetric except for the order
of entry. We study a generalization of the Hotelling model, with a consumer’s utility
from a product depending on the location of product and consumer in product attribute
space, a random utility term that captures idiosyncratic preferences, and the price of the
product. Since the model is analytically intractable, we computationally study location
equilibria, with prices decided simultaneously after locations have been chosen.
As a benchmark, we consider the simultaneous location game, which admits only
symmetric equilibria. If product attribute preferences are weak and idiosyncratic pref-
erences are also weak, both firms locate in the interior of the feasible location space.
With strong product attribute preferences and weak idiosyncratic preferences, price
competition is at its most intense, leading to maximal differentiation. As idiosyncratic
preferences become more important, price competition is mitigated, leading to both
firms locating at the market center.
In the sequential game, we find that when product attribute preferences are strong
and idiosyncratic preferences are weak, the follower has a strong desire to avoid price
competition and the leader experiences a first-mover advantage. However, if idiosyn-
cratic preferences are also strong, price competition is somewhat weaker, and the leader
cedes a location and profit advantage to the follower. Thus, a first-mover disadvantage
exists even though the follower has no obvious advantage over the leader.
If product attribute preferences and idiosyncratic preferences are both weak, max-
imal differentiation results, and entry order is irrelevant. Finally, when idiosyncratic
preferences dominate, price competition is a non-issue, and both players locate at the
market center. Once again, the order of entry does not matter.
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1 Introduction
Is there a first-mover advantage in a market for a new product? Golder and Tellis (1993) re-
port that two famous examples (among others) of this pioneer advantage are Coca Cola and
Crisco Shortening. However, they also point out that many markets have been characterized
by a first-mover disadvantage, rather than an advantage, such as disposable diapers (Pam-
pers over Chux) and chocolate (Hershey over Whitman’s). Boulding and Christen (2003)
report that, over the long term, there is typically a first-mover disadvantage in terms of
profit.
Previous explanations for a first-mover disadvantage have typically relied on dynamic
frictions that violate a notion of symmetry between a pioneer and a later entrant. For
example, a follower may use a leader’s experience to learn about the consumer distribution
(Gal-Or 1987, Fershtman et al. 1990), or gain a technological advantage by developing a
lower cost product (Tyagi 2000). There are countervailing forces as well: For example,
Schmalensee (1982) recognizes that consumer loyalty is a factor that typically benefits the
first mover in a dynamic setting. Chen and Xie (2007) show that, if a firm sells two products,
asymmetry in customer loyalty can be a source of first-mover advantage or disadvantage.
The existence or lack of a first-mover advantage can affect a pioneer’s incentives to enter a
market (Narasimhan and Zhang 2000).
In this paper, we consider the existence of first-mover advantage in a model in which
firms are symmetric, except for the order in which they enter the market. In particular, the
entrant or follower firm does not have a cost advantage and does not learn about demand
from the pioneer or leader firm. More generally, neither firm has a structural advantage or
disadvantage compared to its rival. Instead, we build upon the canonical Hotelling model,
with both firms symmetric in terms of how they are affected by their relative locations with
respect to consumer distribution and their prices. In such a situation, it is widely believed
that the first mover has an advantage, since it can locate at the market center. Nevertheless,
we demonstrate that a first-mover disadvantage may exist in this setting.
The main insight behind our result is that products have many attributes, and modeling
consumer preferences along a single dimension represents a stylized simplification that mod-
els only the most important attribute. For example, if the product is a soft drink such as
Coke or Pepsi, taste is arguably the most important attribute. Nevertheless, a consumer’s
preferences over other attributes, such as brand image or celebrity endorsements, may also
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influence her decision. One way to represent preferences over other unmodeled or unob-
served attributes is via a random utility for the product. The random utility term makes
a consumer’s choice across the two products probabilistic, rather than deterministic. As
mentioned by Anderson et al. (1992), it is common to model choice probabilities as coming
from a multinomial logit distribution.
We consider a generalization of the Hotelling duopoly model that allows for hetero-
geneous preferences over unmodeled attributes in this manner. For clarity, we refer to a
consumer’s preferences over location in the unit interval as “product attribute preferences”,
and to her preferences over unmodeled attributes as “idiosyncratic preferences.” By varying
parameter values in the model, we vary the importance of product attribute preferences and
idiosyncratic preferences in the consumer’s purchase decision.
The multinomial logit model does not admit closed-form solutions for prices or locations.
In fact, even the deterministic choice version of the Hotelling model with prices may be
intractable rendering a numerical analysis necessary (Eaton and Lipsey 1976, Prescott and
Visscher 1977). Nevertheless, we show analytically that, in equilibrium, the firm that is
closer to the market center has a higher price, greater expected demand, and a higher profit
than its competitor. To analyze equilibrium locations, we then turn to a computational
analysis of the model.
As a benchmark, we first consider simultaneous location choice by the two firms, followed
by simultaneous determination of prices. We find that when product attribute preferences
and idiosyncratic preferences are both weak, the firms locate in the interior of the location
space, symmetrically around the market center. If product attribute preferences are strong
while idiosyncratic preferences remain weak, the intensified price competition drives both
firms to differentiate maximally from each other (so they locate at opposite extremes of
the location space). As idiosyncratic preferences become dominant, price competition is
mitigated leading to both firms locating at the market center.
We then focus on sequential location choice: the leader firm picks a location, the follower
firm observes this choice and picks a location, and then both firms simultaneously choose
prices. Numerically, we show that the interplay between product attribute preferences and
idiosyncratic preferences critically affects whether there is a first-mover advantage:
• When product attribute preferences are strong, but idiosyncratic preferences are weak,
a follower’s desire to avoid price competition creates a distinct advantage for the
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first firm to enter the market. However, the leader also prefers to mitigate price
competition, and typically does not locate at the market center.
• With strong product attribute preferences, as idiosyncratic preferences become more
important, the onus gradually shifts on to the leader to mitigate price competition
by ceding locations close to the market center. Equilibrium is characterized first by
symmetric interior locations, so neither firm has an advantage, and then by a first-
mover disadvantage. That is, the follower is closer to the market center than the
leader, and has a higher profit.
• With weak product attribute preferences and strong idiosyncratic preferences, price
competition is relatively weak, and both firms locate at the market center.
• Finally, weak product attribute preferences and weak idiosyncratic preferences are
characterized by maximal differentiation, with firms locating at opposite ends of the
unit interval.
In the Hotelling model without prices, of course, both firms locate at the market center.
d’Aspremont et al. (1979) show that, when prices are introduced and transportation costs
are quadratic in distance, maximal differentiation in product position results. Maximal
differentiation also occurs under sequential entry if firms are restricted to locating in the
unit interval, as shown by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995).
There nevertheless appears to be a popular belief that symmetric location models dis-
plays a first-mover advantage, and that the leader will inevitably occupy the market center.
For example, Golder and Tellis (1993) suggest that firms which enter early and position
near the center of the market can receive higher profits. Similar suggestions about the
benefit (in terms of profit, market share, or both) of entering first and locating near the
center appear in Lieberman and Montgomery (1988), Lilien et al. (1992), and Bohlmann
et al. (2002). Theoretically, Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) show that if product positions are
unrestricted relative to the demand distribution (i.e., firms can locate anywhere on the real
line), a large first-mover advantage exists, with the leader occupying the market center. On
the practical side, Song et al. (1999) find that managers to a significant extent believe in a
first-mover advantage.
Some recent work, however, has found instances of a first-mover disadvantage, even in
games with symmetric payoffs. In pure location games without pricing, the first mover
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may experience a disadvantage when the product attribute space has two or more dimen-
sions (Chawla et al. (2006) and Wagener (2006)). The paper closest to ours in spirit is
Rhee (2006), which computationally demonstrates a first-mover disadvantage for a range
of parameter values in a Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs and random
utility.
Our contribution to this literature is to highlight the relative importance of product
attribute preferences and idiosyncratic preferences in generating a first-mover advantage or
disadvantage in the Hotelling setting. When distance costs are large, product attribute pref-
erences are strong. In such a setting, weak idiosyncratic preferences (i.e., a low variance for
the random utility term) generate a first-mover advantage. However, as idiosyncratic prefer-
ences become more important (i.e., the variance of the random term increases), a first-mover
disadvantage occurs. Conversely, with weak product attribute preferences, equilibrium is
symmetric, with firms locating either at the market center or at opposite ends of the unit
interval.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the model in detail in Section
2. In Section 3, we provide some analytic results for the pricing subgame at stage 2. The
computational analysis of location equilibria and their features is provided in Section 4.
Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a generalization of the Hotelling location model. There are two firms, a pioneer
firm that is referred to as Leader (L) and an entrant called the Follower (F ), competing in a
market. There is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. A point in [0, 1]
denotes a level of a product attribute, and the location of a consumer reflects her ideal level.
At stage 1 of the game, the two firms each position their product in the attribute space,
by choosing a location in [0, 1]. We consider both simultaneous and sequential location in
the first stage. In the sequential move game, firm L chooses its location first, and firm F
chooses its location after observing L’s location choice. At stage 2, after observing each
other’s locations, the firms simultaneously choose prices.1 At stage 3, each consumer buys
one unit of the product from either L or F .
1Some of the previous literature allows firms to locate outside the consumer space [0, 1]. See, for example,
d’Aspremont et al. (1979) and the references in Anderson et al. (1992), Chapter 8.
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Both firms are assumed to have zero marginal costs, allowing us to focus on the me-
chanics of the location and pricing game. In addition, we assume there are no fixed costs.
These assumptions simplify the analysis, but do not affect our results in any qualitative
manner. As described below, given the prices and locations of both firms, each consumer’s
decision is probabilistic. Both firms maximize expected profit, which is the product of their
price and overall expected demand.
Suppose a consumer located at y purchases the good at price pj from firm j located at
xj . The consumer suffers a disutility from purchasing a product that does not possess her
ideal attributes. This disutility is modeled as a distance cost |y−xj |α, where |y−xj | is the
distance between xj and y and α ≥ 1 is a parameter that affects the relative importance of
distance compared to price. For example, if α = 1, the distance cost is linear in distance,
whereas it is quadratic if α = 2. The restriction of α to be at least 1 ensures convexity of
the distance cost. The quantity pj + |y − xj |α may be interpreted as the full price paid by
the consumer at y. The consumption value of the good, assumed to be the same across the
two firms, is denoted by v0 > 0. Then, the consumer’s deterministic utility in this scenario
is
u(y, xj , pj) = v0 − |y − xj |α − pj . (1)
In addition, the utility of the consumer from good j is affected by unmodeled factors.
These unmodeled factors could include other attributes of the good, marketing consider-
ations such as branding, and purely idiosyncratic reactions of the consumer to the good.
Formally, the consumer at y obtains a random utility εyj from the good of each firm j,
which we refer to as the consumer’s “idiosyncratic preference.” Thus, overall utility of the
consumer located at y, if he buys good j at price pj , is
ũ(y, xj , pj) = v0 − |y − xj |α − pj + εyj . (2)
Each consumer purchases one unit of the good from the firm that provides him the highest
overall utility. We assume the consumer does not have an outside option, and must purchase
one of the two goods.2 Since v0 is common across the two goods, it does not affect the
relative choice between the goods. Hence, for the rest of the paper, we assume v0 = 0.
Following Anderson et al. (1992) (see Chapter 2 in particular), we consider a multinomial
logit model of random utility. That is, we assume that for each consumer location y ∈ [0, 1]
2It is straightforward to extend both the model and our numerical results to the case of an outside option,
which may be thought of as a third good that provides the consumer with a deterministic reservation utility.
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and each firm j, the random utility term εyj is independent and identically distributed
with distribution F (x) = ee
−x/µ+γ
, where µ > 0 is a parameter of the distribution and
γ ≈ 0.5772 is Euler’s constant. The distribution has mean zero and variance µ2π2/6, so
that µ is proportional to the standard deviation of the random utility terms.
For each consumer y and each firm j, let uj(y) = u(y, xj , pj) denote the deterministic
utility to the consumer from purchasing and consuming the good of firm j. Then, the
consumer buys the good from L if uL(y) + εL > uF (y) + εF , or εL − εF > uF (y) − uL(y).
Thus, the probability that the consumer at y buys from L is given by qL(y, xL, xF , pL, pF ) =
Prob(εL−εF > uF (y)−uL(y)), and the probability he buys from F is qF (y, xL, xF , pL, pF ) =
1 − qL(y, xL, xF , pL, pF ). Going forward, for brevity we often write these probabilities as
qL(y) and qF (y), suppressing the locations and prices. Since qL(y)+qF (y) = 1 by definition,
qj(y) may be interpreted as the market share of firm j from location y. We also refer to
qL(y) as the expected demand of the consumer at y for firm L.
The overall expected demand of each firm j is then given by dj =
∫ 1
0 qj(y)dy, since
the consumer density is uniform over [0, 1]. Note that dL + dF = 1, so that dj may be
interpreted as the overall market share of firm j. The expected profit of firm j is Πj = pjdj .
The first step to using the multinomial logit model in our analysis is determining the
expected demand of the consumer at y for each firm, given firm locations and prices. As
shown in Proposition 2.2 from Anderson et al. (1992) (on page 39; attributed to an unpub-
lished document by Holman and Marley) the expected demands at location y for L and F









e(v0−|y−xL|α−pL)/µ + e(v0−|y−xF |α−pF )/µ
(4)
Thus, in our model, α captures the importance of the modeled product attribute on
consumer choice, and µ the importance of idiosyncratic preferences. We first consider the
separate effects of each of these parameters on consumer behavior.
2.1 Effect of µ: Variation in idiosyncratic preferences
Recall that the standard deviation of the random utility term is µπ√
6
. Thus, as µ increases,
idiosyncratic preferences become more important, or stronger. When µ = 0, this standard
deviation is zero, so the model reduces to a deterministic choice model in which consumers’
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utilities are dictated entirely by locations and prices. Conversely, as µ → ∞, the random
utility term dominates (in magnitude) the effect of location and price. As can be seen from
equations (3) and (4), at each consumer location y, qL(y) and qF (y) each approach 12 as
µ → ∞. For intermediate values of µ, the relative magnitude of idiosyncratic tastes in
overall utility depends on the locations of consumer and firm, and on the price offered by
the firm.
As an illustration, suppose α = 1 (the linear distance cost model), firm L is located at
0.4 with a price of 1, and firm F is located at 0.9, with a price of 0.8. The deterministic
utility of a consumer at y for firm j’s product is uj(y) = −|y−xj |−pj , so that the expected
demand for L and F of consumer y are
qL(y) =
e(−|y−xL|−pL)/µ
e(−|y−xL|−pL)/µ + e(−|y−xF |−pF )/µ
; qF (y) =
e(−|y−xF |−pF )/µ
e(−|y−xL|−pL)/µ + e(−|y−xF |−pF )/µ
(5)



















Figure 1: Expected demands for firm L from consumers at different locations, with α = 1,
pF = 1, and pL = 0.8
Figure 1 shows the expected demands of consumers at different locations for firm L for
some different values of µ. The solid line shows the expected demand when µ = 0.001. The
expected demand at each location for such a low value of µ is close to the demand in a
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deterministic choice model. Suppose µ were zero, so there were no random term. While
the equations (3)–(4) cannot be used to determine the expected demand at each location,
it is straightforward to directly compute the demand. A consumer at y buys from firm L if
u(y, xL, pL) > u(y, xF , pF ), or −|y−0.4|−1 > −|y−0.9|−0.8. Thus, all consumers located
at y < 0.55 have a demand of 1 for firm L, and all consumers at y > 0.55 have a demand
of zero for firm L. The consumer at y = 0.55 is exactly indifferent between the two firms.
The dashed line corresponds to µ = 0.2, an intermediate value for the idiosyncratic
preferences. For this value of µ, all consumers located to the left of firm L buy from L with
probability approximately 0.82, so that with probability 0.18 they buy the good of firm F .
Conversely, all consumers located to the left of F buy from L with probability 0.03, and
from F with probability 0.97.
Finally, the dotted line indicates the expected demands for a high level of idiosyncratic
preferences, µ = 1. For each consumer location y, the expected demand for L is closer to
0.5, varying from 0.57 at locations to the left of L to 0.33 at locations to the right of F . In
general, as µ increases, at a given location y, the expected demands for each of leader and
follower qL(y), qF (y) approach 0.5.
2.2 Effect of α: Variation in product attribute preferences
For a fixed consumer at y and firm j at xj , let δj = |y−xj | denote the distance between them.
Then, the deterministic utility of consumer y for the good of firm j is uj(y) = −δαj − pj .
Thus, the parameter α affects only the impact of distance (along the product attribute) on
consumer utility, and changing α results in a change in the relative importance of product
attribute and price on consumer utility. Since δj is typically strictly less than 1, increasing
α results in a weakening of the importance of distance; i.e., a weakening of product attribute
preferences.




= −αδα−1j . (6)
Thus, as distance (δj) increase, the utility of the consumer at y decreases.
In the linear distance model, with α = 1, ∂uj(y)∂δj = −1, a constant, for all y ∈ [0, 1]. As
α increases, ∂uj(y)∂δj increases (i.e., becomes closer to zero) for low values of δj , but decreases
(i.e., becomes more negative) for high values of δj . That is, as product attribute preferences
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become weaker, consumers close to firm j become less sensitive to the effects of distance,
whereas consumers far from firm j become more sensitive to the effects of distance. In
the limit, as α → ∞, ∂uj(y)∂δj → 0 as long as δj < 1, and product attribute preferences are
irrelevant to a consumer’s purchase decision.
2.3 Solving the Game
We solve the game by backward induction. Consumer demands at each location at stage
3 are given by equations (3) and (4). Consider stage 2, where firms choose their prices,
having chosen locations at stage 1. Given locations xL, xF and prices pL, pF , the expected
profit of firm j, for j = l, f , is




where qj(y), given in equation (5), is a function of xL, xF , pL, pF , which are suppressed for
brevity.
The prices are chosen in a Nash equilibrium of the game at this stage. Each firm chooses
its price to maximize its expected profit, holding fixed the price of the other firm. The best









dy = 0. (8)
For now, we assume that the second-order condition ∂
2Πj
∂p2j
< 0 is satisfied. We show this
analytically when locations are symmetric about the market center in Proposition 2 below,
and confirm it computationally in our numeric analysis.








qL(y)qF (y)dy = 0, for j = l, f. (9)
The Nash equilibrium prices at stage 2, p∗L, p
∗
F , simultaneously satisfy equations (9).
Considering the expressions for qL(y) and qF (y) in equations (3)–(4), and noting that
uL(y) = −|y − xL|α − pL and uF (y) = −|y − xF |α − pF , it is immediate to see that,
in general, the best response conditions that determine prices at stage 2 do not admit a
closed-form solution.
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However, in the special case that firms co-locate (i.e., xL = xF ), equilibrium prices are
straightforwardly determined. In this case, the choice probability of any consumer depends
only on prices:
qL(y, x, x, pL, pF ) =
e(−|y−x|
α−pL)/µ
e(−|y−x|α−pL)/µ + e(−|y−x|α−pF )/µ
=
e−pL/µ
e−pL/µ + e−pF /µ
.




Thus, the equilibrium prices are determined to be p∗L = p
∗
F = 2µ.
Given equilibrium prices p∗L, p
∗
F at stage 2, we work back to stage 1. Let Π̂L(xL, xF ) =
ΠL(xL, xF , p∗L(xL, xF ), p
∗
F (xL, xF )). That is, Π̂L(xL, xF ) is the profit accruing to L if the
two firms locate at xL and xF respectively, and choose equilibrium prices as described above.
Let Π̂F (xL, xF ) be similarly defined.
2.3.1 Simultaneous move game
In the simultaneous move game, both firms simultaneously choose locations to maximize
their own profit. Again, the optimum for each player is described by a first-order condition.













F ) = 0 (10)
For the simultaneous move game, we restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria that
are symmetric (that is, x∗L + x
∗
F = 1). Based on our numeric findings, we conjecture that
the only pure-strategy equilibria in the simultaneous move game are indeed symmetric.
2.3.2 Sequential move game
In the sequential move game, given a location xL selected by L, firm F chooses a location
xL which maximizes its profit once both firms set their equilibrium prices:
x∗F (xL) = arg max
xF∈[0,1]
Π̂F (xL, xF ) (11)
The corresponding first-order condition for F ’s maximization problem is ∂Π̂F (xL,xF )∂xF = 0.
Continuing backwards, L’s problem is to select a location x∗L that maximizes profit



















F ), at stage
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2. Define ΠL(xL) = ΠL(xL, x∗F (xL), pL(xL, x
∗
F (xL)), pF (xL, x
∗
F (xL))). Since the consumer
distribution is uniform, and hence symmetric about the market center at 0.5, we can without
loss of generality restrict L to locating in the sub-interval [0, 0.5]. Then, L’s optimal location
satisfies:
x∗L = arg max
xL≤0.5
ΠL(xL), (12)
or alternatively, satisfies the first-order condition ∂ΠL(xL)∂xL = 0.
Since we do not have a closed-form expression for equilibrium prices at stage 2, we cannot
analytically solve for equilibrium locations in either the simultaneous or the sequential move
game. Instead, we numerically solve for equilibria. The results are presented in Section 4.
First, to obtain some insight into the tradeoffs faced by the firms, we consider a few special
cases of the pricing subgame at stage 2.
3 Analytic Results in the Pricing Subgame
Consider the pricing subgame at stage 2. Suppose each firm j = L,F has chosen its
location, xj . Assume that, for any pair of locations (xL, xF ) chosen at stage 1, there
exists a pure-strategy pricing equilibrium at stage 2. This assumption is borne out in our
numeric calculations. Through much of this section, we also assume that the solution to
the first-order conditions (9) does indeed constitute a pair of optimal prices for F and L.
In Proposition 2, we prove this when firms have symmetric locations. More broadly, we
confirm in our numeric solution that prices are optimal for each set of parameter values and
firm locations. That is, we verify numerically that prices found by solving equations (9) do
indeed maximize profits.
Location is critical to relative outcomes in the game. First, we consider asymmetric
locations, with one firm (say firm i) being closer to the market center than its rival (firm j).
We show that the firm that locates closest to the center will, in equilibrium, have a higher
price, market share, and profit than the other firm. The proof of this proposition, and all
other analytic results, is in the Appendix, Section 6.
Recall that the overall expected demand for firm i is di =
∫ 1
0 qi(y)dy, which is also the
market share of firm i in our model.
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium of the pricing subgame at stage 2, the firm closer to the
center has a higher price, a higher overall expected demand, and a higher profit than its
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rival. That is, if |xi − 0.5| < |xj − 0.5|, then p∗i > p∗j , d∗i > d∗j , and Π∗i > Π∗j .
In the next section, we show numerically that for a large region of parameter values,
equilibria in the simultaneous-move game are characterized by one firm being closer to the
market center than its rival. Given Proposition 1, in such equilibria, a first-mover advantage
will exist if and only if firm L is closer to the market center (i.e., the point 0.5) than firm
F . Equilibria with F closer to the market center will necessarily involve a first-mover
disadvantage.
Next, consider the special case in which firms have located symmetrically around the
market center (the point 0.5), i.e., when xL + xF = 1. We first show that in this case,
the equilibrium prices and profits of the two firms are equal. Further, it is reasonable
to conjecture that, as the distance between the firms increases in the location stage, the
equilibrium prices will increase in the pricing subgame. The absence of an outside option
then implies that overall profits will also go up. While this is hard to prove for the general
case (i.e., keeping one player’s location fixed while moving the other player further away), we
are able to prove this for the symmetric locations case. Finally, we show that, when locations
are symmetric about the market center, the solution to the best response equations (9)
indeed determines optimal prices; that is, a second-order condition for profit maximization
is satisfied.
Proposition 2 Suppose firms’ locations are symmetric about the market center (i.e., xi +
xj = 1). Then, in the pricing subgame at stage 2,










(ii) equilibrium prices increase as firms’ locations become more distant from the center, and
(iii) the solution to the first-order conditions (9) maximizes the profit of each firm j, keeping
fixed the price of the other firm, and therefore characterizes an equilibrium of the pricing
subgame.
Thus for any fixed µ, the firms would like to increase the distance from each other
in order to sustain higher prices and consequently higher profits. This impulse to move
away from each other provides a repulsive force. On the other hand, for any pair of firm
locations, if one firm moves closer, its expected demand increases if prices stay unchanged.
This provides an attractive force. In general, of course, the prices will change, and the
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interplay between the two forces will determine the outcomes. The equilibrium locations
are the points where the attractive and repulsive forces are in balance. Our numerical results
suggest that, in the simultaneous move game, this balance is only attained when locations
are symmetric around the market center, while in the sequential move game, locations need
not be symmetric.
4 Numerical analysis of location equilibria
We numerically determine equilibrium locations and prices for a range of (α, µ) parameters.
Determining the optimal location essentially requires determining the equilibrium prices
for each pair of feasible locations. However, as mentioned above, the equilibrium prices,
which satisfy equations (9) do not admit a closed-form solution in general. To determine
the equilibria of the overall game numerically, we trace the following steps:




m , · · · , 1
]
represent this
grid. The mass at each point on this grid is 1m+1 .
















2n , · · · , 1
]
represent the grid for F .
Notice that we restrict L to locating in [0, 0.5]. As mentioned earlier, given the
symmetry of the consumer distribution about the market center 0.5, this is without
loss of generality. We also restrict F to locating in [0.5, 1]. While it is intuitive that
F will want to locate on the other side of the market center as L, we first verified
numerically that this property holds. That is, for each pair (α, µ) of parameter values,
we allowed F to locate on a grid that spanned [0, 1], and found that in each case F
preferred to locate in the sub-interval [0.5, 1].
3. For each point on the location grid of L, determine F ’s best response. This is done
as follows:
(a) For each point on F ’s location grid, given L’s location, determine equilibrium
prices by finding a solution to equations (9). Verify that the second-order con-
dition for optimal prices holds.
(b) Determine F ’s profit at that point.
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(c) F ’s best response to L’s location is the point at which F attains maximum profit.3
4. Determine equilibrium in the simultaneous move game as follows. We search for all
symmetric equilibria of this game (since the simultaneous-move game is symmetric by
construction).
In any symmetric equilibrium, L is as far from the market center (at 0.5) as F .
Thus, 0.5− x∗L = x∗F − 0.5, or x∗L + x∗F = 1. Any point on F ’s best response function
at which xF = 1 − xL thus provides equilibrium locations in the simultaneous-move
game. Notice that our numerical procedure finds only pure strategy equilibria.
5. Determine equilibrium in the sequential move game as follows. For each point in L’s
location grid, determine the best response of F . Compute L’s profit at this location.
L’s optimal action is given by the location that maximizes its profit. Again, we find
pure strategy equilibria of the game.
In our numerical analysis, we set m = 400. That is, consumers are located at a set
of 401 equidistant points in the interval [0, 1], with a mass equal to 1/401 at each point.
Further, we set n = 200, so that the feasible location grid for L consists of 201 equidistant
points in [0, 0.5], and that for F consists of 201 equidistant points in [0.5, 1].
Finally, we consider values of µ in the range 0.2 to 2.0, with steps of 0.1, and values of
α in the range 0.125 to 3.0, with steps of 0.125. We explored larger values of µ and α, and
found qualitatively similar equilibrium patterns. Our results extrapolate to (α, µ) values
not explicitly displayed.
4.1 Linear distances model: Follower’s best response
Before we turn to equilibria, we first consider the best response of F for each location L
may choose. In the simultaneous-move game, L’s best response is exactly symmetric. In
the sequential move game, L takes F ’s best response into account in choosing its optimal
location.
In Figure 2, we exhibit F ’s best response for each location of L, in the linear distance
model (i.e., fixing α = 1). The best responses are shown for three different levels of µ.
Recall that the consumer distribution is symmetric around the market center at 0.5.
Thus, in the absence of price competition, firms would wish to be at the center, to minimize
3In the numerical computations, the best response of F was unique for each set of parameters and fixed
L location.
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Figure 2: F ’s best response given L’s location, for α = 1
their distance to the average consumer. However, price competition is at its most intense
when the firms co-locate, and provides a motive for a firm to locate far from its competitor.
Since demand at each consumer location is nonlinear in prices and in the idiosyncratic
preferences (i.e., µ), the tradeoff between these two effects is also nonlinear.
For low values of µ (in the figure, µ = 0.2), F ’s best response is mostly upward-sloping
as L approaches the center, starting with a location of 0. That is, the closer L is to the
market center, the further away from the center F wishes to be. This is because low values
of µ correspond to relatively unimportant idiosyncratic preferences, so the price competition
effect dominates. Thus, firms have a natural desire to separate out in location.
As µ increases from 0.2, idiosyncratic preferences become more important, mitigating
the effects of price competition. Though not shown in the figure, the nonlinear tradeoff
between the distance and price competition effects leads to F being further away from the
center if L locates at 0 (the left extreme of its location space), and closer to L if L locates
at 0.5, the market center.
Further increases in µ are characterized by further mitigation of price competition, so
that at µ = 0.95, F ’s best response is downward-sloping, and for yet higher values of µ, F
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comes in even closer to the market center at each L location. That is, as µ increases in this
range, F ’s entire best response curve falls toward 0.5. Notice also that F ’s best response
is most sensitive to changes in µ when L locates at the market center, and least sensitive
when L locates at 0.
4.1.1 Equilibria in the simultaneous-move game for α = 1
Now, consider equilibria of the simultaneous-move game. As mentioned earlier, in a sym-
metric equilibrium, xF = 1 − xL. This line is shown as the dashed “Symmetry line” in
Figure 2. All points where the best response functions intersect with this line represent
symmetric equilibria in the simultaneous move game (these points are the solid circles in
the figure). As may be seen, for low values of µ, the equilibrium is unique (in the class of
symmetric pure-strategy equilibria), and is characterized by both firms being in the interior
of their respective location spaces.
Initially, as µ increases, firms move further away from the center (not shown in the fig-
ure), and then move back in toward the center once idiosyncratic preferences are sufficiently
important. At µ = 0.95, there are two pure-strategy equilibria in the simultaneous-move
game: one with locations of L and F at (0.32,0.68), and the other with both firms at the
market center, (0.5, 0.5). When idiosyncratic preferences are even more important (in the
figure, at µ = 2), price competition is relatively weak, and the distance effect dominates.
As a result, both firms locate at the market center in equilibrium.
4.1.2 Equilibria in the sequential-move game for α = 1
Figure 2 also shows the location equilibria of the sequential-move game (the equilibrium
points are shown as solid diamonds). Low levels of idiosyncratic preferences (i.e., low values
of µ) are characterized by a first-mover advantage. That is, L is closer to the market center
than F (since the equilibrium point is above the symmetry line when µ = 0.2), and hence
by Proposition 1, has a higher profit. Conversely, high levels of idiosyncratic preferences
are characterized by a first-mover disadvantage: F is closer to the center than L.
Compare the sequential-move game equilibrium locations with those in the simultaneous-
move game. At low values of µ (e.g., µ = 0.2), F ’s best response function is upward-
sloping at the simultaneous-move game equilibrium. That is, by moving in closer to the
market center than in the simultaneous-move equilibrium, L can drive F further away from
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the center. This results in L being closer to the market center in the equilibrium of the
sequential-move game.
Conversely, at higher values of µ (µ = 0.95 and 2), F ’s best response function is
downward-sloping at the simultaneous-move game equilibrium locations. In this case, if
L were to come in closer to the center, F would respond by moving in as well, which would
exacerbate price competition between the firms. Thus, L chooses to move away from the
center, conceding a location advantage to F .
Therefore, as compared to the simultaneous-move game equilibrium locations, L’s choice
in the sequential-move game appears to be dominated by the price competition effect. When
L can come in towards the market center while still maintaining a distance between the
firms (which happens for low values of µ), it does so. When moving towards the center
would increase price competition, it moves further away from the center.
4.1.3 Complete equilibria for linear distances
















Figure 3: Complete equilibrium locations for α = 1.
Figure 3 shows all equilibrium locations for different values of µ for α = 1. Consider
the simultaneous move game first. As discussed above, for extremely low values of µ, the
unique pure-strategy equilibria are characterized by players maintaining a sufficient distance
between them. As µ increases, not only do the players’ locations get closer to the market
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center, but both players locating at the center can also be sustained in equilibrium. For
some values of µ, the figure shows more than one non-central equilibrium pair. This is due
to the imprecision introduced by taking a finite location grid in the numerical analysis. As
the follower’s best response curve in Figure 2 becomes tangential to the symmetry line, the
numerical computation reports multiple equilibria in the region where the two curves are
close to coinciding.
As µ increases further, idiosyncratic factors dominate, mitigating price competition to
the extent that players are no longer reluctant to locate close to each other. Thus, the only
equilibrium sustained in the simultaneous move game is the one where both players locate
at the center.
Figure 3 also shows the equilibrium locations in the sequential move game. The overall
pattern is the same: initially, both players maintain some amount of distance between each
other; the distance initially increases with increasing µ, and then decreases as both players
move towards the market center. The reason for this overall pattern is the same as in the
simultaneous move game: increasing importance of the idiosyncratic factors (increasing µ)
reduces the benefits of maintaining inter-firm distance.
It is also straightforward from the figure to identify regions under which one of the
players dominates the other in terms of profit and market share. From Proposition 1, the
firm closer to the market center has a higher price, market share, and profit. Therefore, we
find that for low values of µ (approximately in the range [0.2,0.8]), the first mover maintains
an advantage, while for intermediate values of µ (in the approximate range [0.8, 2.2]), the
follower has the advantage. As in the simultaneous move game, once µ is sufficiently high
only the central equilibrium is obtained.
For µ in the range [1.8, 2.2], separation is maintained in the sequential move game, even
though the simultaneous move game has both players locating at the center. For an even
larger range of µ values, in equilibrium the distance between the firms in the sequential
move game is significantly greater than the distance in the simultaneous move game. Since
prices increase when the firms are further apart, in this range of µ the sequential move game
results in higher prices faced by consumers, and overall higher profits for the two firms.
A brief explanation of this phenomenon is as follows. For these values of µ, the idiosyn-
cratic factors matter somewhat, but there is still room for differentiation between firms.
Re-examining Figure 2, it may be noted that, at µ = 2, the best-response curve of Follower
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is downward-sloping at the point of intersection with the symmetry line. In the simultane-
ous move game, the strength of the idiosyncratic factors allows the two players to move in
closer to each other. However, in the sequential game, the downward-sloping best response
curve of F indicates that there are higher profits to be made if both players move away
from each other. Since the slope of the line is less than 45 degrees, the movement by F
away from the market center is slower than the movement of L. That is, in equilibrium F is
closer to the market center than L, and as a result earns a higher profit than L. However,
since L is maximizing her own profit rather than minimizing her relative disadvantage, it
is still in L’s best interest to sustain this asymmetric equilibrium.
4.2 Equilibria as α and µ vary
We now consider equilibria in the game for different values of α and µ. Thus, we allow
the attribute preferences to vary (by varying α), along with variation in the idiosyncratic
preferences. This allows us to study the relative impact of the attribute and idiosyncratic
preferences, and their impact on equilibrium locations and firm advantages.
4.2.1 Simultaneous-move game
The equilibria for the simultaneous move game are shown in Figure 4. We identify three
classes of equilibria in the simultaneous move game. All the equilibria we found are sym-
metric in location (so x∗L + x
∗
F = 1). Thus, by Proposition 2, the two firms have equal
prices and profits in each of these equilibria. As already seen in the case of α = 1, multiple
equilibria may exist in the simultaneous move game.
1. Maximal differentiation: The firms are at the extremes of the location space, with
x∗L = 0 and x
∗
F = 1. These equilibria are observed for α ≥ 1.7, with small values of µ.
2. Central location: Both firms are at the market center, with x∗L = x
∗
F = 0.5. For each
value of α, these equilibria are observed when µ is sufficiently high, with the threshold
value of µ falling as α increases.
3. Symmetric interior location: Firms are strictly in the interior of the location space,
with x∗L ∈ (0, 0.5), x∗F ∈ (0.5, 1), and x∗F = 1 − x∗L. These equilibria are observed for













Figure 4: Regions of different equilibria in simultaneous move game
4.2.2 Elasticities of profit
To explain these equilibria, we consider the sensitivity of profit with respect to price and
distance. Since the level of profit changes with α and µ, we use elasticity as a scale-free
measure of sensitivity. Formally, the elasticity of the profit of firm i with respect to its own
price is defined as ηΠp =
∂Πi(xL,xF ,pL,pF )/∂pi
Πi(xL,xF ,pL,pF )/pi
. Thus, the elasticity varies with the locations
and prices of both firms. Further, although α and µ are suppressed as arguments of the
profit function, both profit and elasticity vary with α and µ as well.
To standardize our elasticity computation, we fix firm locations at xF = 0.25 and
xL = 0.75. We choose these locations because they are the center of the respective location
spaces for the two firms, and provide a notion of average elasticity (average taken over
all firm locations). Given these locations, we determine equilibrium prices p∗L(xL, xF ) and
p∗F (xL, xF ) for each (α, µ) pair (since the locations are symmetric, the equilibrium prices are
equal across the firms). Defining a change in price for L of ∆p = 0.0025, we then compute
the elasticity of profit of L with respect to its price for a given (α, µ) pair as follows:
ηΠp =
(ΠL(xL, xF , p∗(xL, xF ) + ∆p, p∗(xL, xF ))−ΠL(xL, xF , p∗(xL, xF ), p∗(xL, xF )))/∆p
ΠL(xL, xF , p∗(xL, xF ), p∗(xL, xF ))/p∗(xL, xF )
In computing the elasticity of firm i’s profit with respect to its own location, we are
careful to ensure that firms choose optimal prices given the new location. As before, we
define xL = 0.25 and xF = 0.25. Define a change of location for L of ∆x = 0.0025. For a
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given (α, µ) pair, we compute the elasticity of L’s profit with respect to its own location as
follows:
ηΠx =
(ΠL(xL + ∆x, xF , p∗L(xL + ∆x, xF ), p
∗
F (xL + ∆x, xF ))−ΠL(xL, xF , p∗(xL, xF ), p∗(xL, xF )))/∆x









































Elasticity of profit w.r.t. location
α
ηΠ x
Figure 5: Elasticities of L’s profit with respect to (a) price, and (b) location.
Figure 5 displays the elasticities of L’s profit with respect to location and price (ηΠx and
ηΠp ), as α and µ vary. Consider first the elasticity of profit with respect to price (shown in
the left of Figure 5). Note that the elasticity is consistently negative; since the initial price
is optimal given the firm locations, any change in price leads to a smaller profit. For small
µ, the elasticity increases in magnitude as α increases. As α becomes high, distance cost
becomes less relevant (since the distance from any consumer to either firm is less than 1,
increasing α reduces the importance of distance in consumer utility). Thus, consumers are
more sensitive to price, resulting in an increased profit elasticity. For large µ, the elasticity
is more or less flat in α, and relatively small in magnitude: as idiosyncratic preferences
become more important, consumers are less sensitive to price.
Next, consider the elasticity with respect to location, ηΠx (shown on the right in Figure 5).
When µ is small, ηΠx is negative, with a large magnitude for α close to 1 (i.e., when distance
cost is more relevant to the consumer). At these values of (α, µ), there is a strong repellent
force on the firm. That is, fixing F at xF = 0.75, firm L would like to move further away
than 0.25, to locations closer to zero. For large µ, the elasticity ηΠx is positive, but small
in magnitude. Idiosyncratic preferences are more important when µ is large, so the impact
of location is small and firms are willing to locate closer together. Hence the positive ηΠx ,
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pointing to an attractive force between firms.
It is important to note that we measure elasticities at the fixed locations of xL = 0.25
and xF = 0.75. These elasticities vary across locations, especially when µ is small. Although
equilibrium locations themselves change as α and µ change, nevertheless the elasticities we
construct at fixed locations provide insight into the outcomes of the overall game.
First, consider the region with (approximately) µ ≥ 0.4 and α ≥ 3 − µ. For these
parameter values, idiosyncratic preferences are important (µ is large) and distance costs
relatively unimportant (α is also large). In this region, the location elasticity of profit,
ηΠx , is positive, so L would like to come in closer toward the center, when F is fixed at
xF = 0.75. Further, the price elasticity of profit, ηΠp , is small in magnitude, so profit is
relatively invariant to price. Thus, there is an attractive force between the firms, driving
them to locate towards each other. The most that they can get towards each other is the
center, resulting in the central equilibrium.
Next, consider the region with µ ≤ 0.4 and α ≥ 1.5. Here, idiosyncratic preferences
are relatively unimportant, as are distance costs. Thus, consumers are highly sensitive to
price. As a result, the price elasticity ηΠp is negative and has large magnitude. The desire
to avoid price competition results in the location elasticity, ηΠx , also being negative. There
is a strong repulsive force causing firms to differentiate in order to raise prices. Hence, the
equilibrium is characterized by maximal differentiation.
Finally, consider the remaining region: small-to-moderate values of both µ and α. Here,
distance costs are important, resulting in a negative location elasticity, ηΠx . Idiosyncratic
preferences are only moderately important, so ηΠp is small in magnitude. The negative
location elasticity points to gains from differentiation, whereas the small price elasticity
suggests the gains are limited. As a result, the equilibrium is characterized by symmetric
interior locations.
4.2.3 Sequential-move game
We now turn to the sequential game. The equilibria are depicted in Figure 6.
We find that there are five classes of equilibria. The first three of these correspond to
similar equilibria in the simultaneous move game, with firms having equal prices and profits.
The last two exhibit either a first-mover advantage or a first-mover disadvantage.
1. Maximal differentiation: The firms are at the extremes of the location space, with
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Figure 6: Regions of different equilibria in sequential move game
x∗L = 0 and x
∗
F = 1. The parameter region for which these equilibria are found
roughly corresponds to the maximal differentiation region of the simultaneous move
game.
2. Central equilibrium: Both firms are at the market center, with x∗L = x
∗
F = 0.5.
Again, the parameter region corresponds roughly to the central equilibrium region in
the simultaneous move game
3. Symmetric interior equilibrium: Firms are strictly in the interior of the location space,
with x∗L ∈ (0, 0.5), x∗F ∈ (0.5, 1), and x∗F = 1−x∗L. Observe that the parameter region
in which these equilibria hold is a small subset of the symmetric interior region of the
simultaneous move game. In other areas where the simultaneous move game has a
symmetric interior equilibrium, we find that one of the two firms has a profit advantage
in the sequential game.
4. Leader advantage: Firm L is closer to the center than the follower, with 0.5 − x∗L <
x∗F −0.5. Proposition 1 implies that L has a profit advantage in these equilibria, which
is confirmed in our numerical results. The parameter region in which these equilibria
obtain is roughly the triangle bounded by (µ = 0.2, α = 1.8) and (µ = 0.45, α = 1).
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The maximum Leader advantage we observe is when α = 1.5 and µ = 0.2. At
these values, we find x∗L = 0.2525, x
∗
F = 0.9775, p
∗
L = 0.9382 and p
∗
F = 0.8098. Thus,
L is approximately halfway between one end of the market and the market center,
while F is almost at the other end of the market. This locational advantage of L is
reflected in the higher profit observed: Π∗L = 0.5036, with Π
∗
F = 0.3751, so that the
leader has a profit advantage of 34.24%.
5. Follower advantage: Firm F is closer to the center (0.5 − x∗L > x∗F − 0.5), so, by
Proposition 1, has a profit advantage. As shown in Figure 6, the parameter region in
which these equilibria obtain consists of intermediate values of µ, for α ranging from
1 to approximately 2.5.
The maximum follower advantage is when α = 2.5 and µ = 0.6. At these
values, L locates at x∗L = 0 and F locates at x
∗
F = 0.7425, with prices p
∗
L = 1.2648
and p∗F = 1.3846. The resultant profits are Π
∗
L = 0.6038 and Π
∗
F = 0.7236 respectively,
translating to a 16.56% profit disadvantage for L.
In comparing the equilibria of the simultaneous and sequential move games, a striking
feature is the close overlap of the regions with central equilibrium and maximal differenti-
ation. This is no coincidence: we prove below that if the sequential-move game leads to a
symmetric equilibrium, then the same symmetric equilibrium must also be an outcome of
the simultaneous move game.
Proposition 3 Suppose that, for some (α, µ), the sequential location game has a symmetric
equilibrium. Then, the same set of locations and prices constitute an equilibrium of the
corresponding simultaneous move game.
Note that the converse is not true; in fact, if it were, there would be no asymmetry
in profits in the sequential move game. However, Proposition 3 indicates the following: if
(α, µ) are such that we are in the region of Maximal differentiation or Central equilibrium,
then entry order does not matter because whether the game is played with sequential entry
or simultaneous entry, the same equilibria will arise.
4.2.4 Asymmetric equilibria in sequential move game
Let us now examine the asymmetric equilibria, where one or the other firm has an advantage.
If we examine the elasticities of profit in Figure 5, we see that the asymmetric equilibria
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occur approximately in the regions where ηΠx is negative. At these values of µ and α, firms
prefer to be differentiated: if locations are fixed at 0.25 for L and 0.75 for F , firm L would
rather be further from the market center.
Consider first the case when ηΠx is negative, and large in magnitude. This means that
once L has chosen its location, F has a strong incentive to locate far away from the center
(and also far away from L) in order to try and maintain a sufficient distance to keep prices
high. An example of this is when α = 1 and µ = 0.2. This strong repellent force on F
is reflected in the best-response curve: an examination of Figure 2 shows that F ’s best-
response is upward-sloping in L’s location for small values of µ, meaning that a move close
to the market center by L results in F moving away from the market center. Note that
there is a limit to this effect as well; the slope of F ’s best-response is less than 45 degrees,
so that F ’s response to a move by L is relatively small in magnitude. Thus L does not
find it optimal to go to the extreme of locating at the market center. Indeed, equilibrium
locations are (x∗L = 0.2225, x
∗
F = 0.8275).
In general, if the repellent force is strong enough, F will move farther from the mar-
ket center as L moves a little closer, resulting in a profit advantage for L. This occurs
when product attribute preferences are strong (i.e., α is low, so price competition is a po-
tential issue) and idiosyncratic preferences are weak (i.e., µ is too low to mitigate price
competition).
In contrast, consider the case when ηΠx is negative but small in magnitude, such as when
α = 1 and µ = 0.95. For a fixed location of L, the repellent force on F is no longer as
strong, due to the importance of idiosyncratic preferences in consumer choice. However,
the fact that ηΠx is negative means that there are still gains to be made by differentiation.
How is L to realize this gain? Since price competition is weaker than when µ is low, L
rationally anticipates that F will not differentiate enough, and thus takes the initiative
of differentiation by locating further away from the market center. This phenomenon is
reflected in the best-response curve: Figure 2 shows that F ’s best response is now downward-
sloping with L’s location, but at an angle less than 45 degrees. In fact, this shows that
movement away from the market center by L results in F also moving away from the center,
but not by as much as L. Therefore, even if F ends up closer to the market center than L
(resulting in a profit advantage for F ), L is still better off compared to the simultaneous
move equilibrium.
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In effect, the first-mover disadvantage occurs when L takes action to “expand the pie,”
so that both firms earn a higher profit than in the simultaneous move equilibrium. That
is, even though L has conceded a profit advantage to F , it does increase its own profit
(compared to the equilibrium profit in the simultaneous-move game) in the process.
4.3 Implications on firm entry order
Whenever the sequential-move game results in a symmetric equilibrium, the same equilib-
rium holds in the simultaneous-move game. In such an event, entry order clearly does not
matter.
However, when asymmetric equilibria appear in the sequential-move game, the order
of entry matters. If product attribute preferences are strong and idiosyncratic preferences
are weak, we are in a region of first-mover advantage. There will therefore be a “rush to
market” to realize this advantage. Conversely, with strong product attribute preferences
and strong idiosyncratic preferences, we are in a region of first-mover disadvantage. Thus,
both firms would prefer that the other firm move first.
In reality, of course, several other factors may also affect the timing of entry timing,
including technology, entry barriers, evolving customer demand, and incomplete informa-
tion. These, in conjunction with the impact of location and pricing, will then determine
the optimal time to enter.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a duopoly location model with an allowance for idiosyncratic
preferences that may affect a consumer’s choice over the two products. We find that the
interplay between product attribute preferences and idiosyncratic preferences is critical
in determining whether there is a first-mover advantage or disadvantage in the model.
Strong product attribute preferences are associated with strong price competition, and lead
to a first-mover advantage. Idiosyncratic preferences mitigate price competition, and, in
conjunction with strong product attribute preferences, imply a first-mover disadvantage.
Importantly, the first-mover disadvantage exists even though, other than entry order,
firms are symmetric in our setting: the follower firm has neither a cost advantage nor any
extra information about demand over the leader. Despite this, we show that the leader
will concede the market center to mitigate price competition with the follower. Of course,
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our analysis leaves many open questions. Important extensions include consideration of
multiple product attributes and a larger number of firms.
While we explicitly consider a Hotelling setting in this paper, we have confirmed that
our insights into first-mover advantage do carry over more broadly to location models.
Two other popular location models are those of Lane (1980), and the Defender model of
Hauser and Shugan (1983). In Lane’s model, the leader again captures the market center
and commands a profit which is more than twice that of the follower. We performed a
numerical analysis similar to that in Section 4 in the Lane model (after adding the random
utility term), and obtained qualitatively similar results about the existence of a first-mover
advantage or disadvantage, depending on the strength of product attribute preferences and
idiosyncratic preferences. We are not aware of a sequential location analysis of the Defender
model.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose |xi− 0.5| < |xj − 0.5|. If xj < xi < 0.5, the result is immediate. Hence, assume
that xi < 0.5 < xj . Then, we have 0.5− xi < xj − 0.5, or xi + xj > 1.
Let (p∗i , p
∗
j ) denote the price equilibrium for these locations. Then, rewriting equations
(9) slightly, for each firm l, f , the following best response condition for optimal price must

























j (y)dy, which provides a contradiction.
Let y0 = xi+xj−1, and y1 = xi+xj2 =
y0+1
2 . That is, the point y1 is the midpoint of the
interval [xi, xj ], and also the midpoint of the interval [y0, 1]. Since xi + xj > 1, it follows
that y0 > 0.
Let z be any point in the interval [y0, 1]. The symmetric image of z about the point y1
is given by z = 1 + y0 − z. Therefore, we have xi − z = z − xj , for any z ∈ [y0, 1]. Since
p∗i ≤ p∗j by assumption, it must be that qi(z) ≥ qj(z) for any z ∈ [y0, 1]. Therefore, the







Now, consider the interval [0, y0]. By construction, for any point z ∈ [0, y0], we have
|xi−z| < |xj−z|. Further, we have assumed p∗i ≤ p∗j . Therefore, it follows that q∗i (z) > q∗j (z),


























j (y)dy. However, by inspection of the








j (y)dy =⇒ p∗i > p∗j , which
is a contradiction.
Therefore, it cannot be that p∗i ≤ p∗j , so that we have p∗i > p∗j . Now, from equation (13),
it follows immediately that p∗i > p
∗










j (y)dy. Since firm i
has a higher price and a higher market share than firm j, its profit is also higher.
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Suppose xi + xj = 1. Then, the point z = 12 lies midway between xi and xj . Suppose
that p∗i < p
∗
j . Now, for every z ∈ [0, 12 ], consider the point z = 1− z ∈ [
1





it follows that q∗i (z) > q
∗
j (z). Hence, q
∗
j (z) = 1 − q∗i (z) < q∗i (z) = 1 − q∗j (z). Therefore, it






or d∗i > d
∗









Therefore, it cannot be that p∗i < p
∗
j .
By the same argument, we can rule out the case that p∗i > p
∗
j . Hence, it must be that
p∗i = p
∗
j . Now, since locations are symmetric about the market center, and the prices are
equal, it must be that d∗i = d
∗





(ii) Because symmetric locations imply equal prices (as shown in part (i)), the market share










Now consider two sets of locations, with (xL, xF ) given by (0.5 − h1, 0.5 + h1) and
(0.5−h2, 0.5+h2) respectively, where h2 > h1 ≥ 0. Since the firms’ locations are symmetric,
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the equilibrium prices must be equal. Let p1 denote the equilibrium price of each firm when
the firms locate at (0.5− h1, 0.5 + h1). Then, p1 satisfies equation (17).
Consider what happens when firms locate at (0.5 − h2, 0.5 + h2). Both firms must
still price equally; let p2 denote this price. Fix a consumer y < 1/2, and let δ(y, x
j
i ) be
defined as |y − xji |, where i ∈ {l, f}, and j ∈ {1, 2} represents the first and second set
of locations respectively. Symmetric locations, equal prices, and h2 > h1 imply that for
any y < 1/2, we have δ(y, x2L) − δ(y, x1L) ≤ δ(y, x2F ) − δ(y, x1F ). That is, any consumer
at y < 1/2 sees their nominal distance δ(y, x) from L increase by an amount that is no
more than the increase in distance from F . Now recall that α ≥ 1, which ensures that the
deterministic consumer utility −|y − x|α − p is convex in distance. Resultantly, we have
qL(y, 0.5− h2, 0.5 + h2, p2, p2) > qL(y, 0.5− h1, 0.5 + h1, p1, p1). The product qL(y)qF (y) is
therefore smaller for every y 6= 1/2 under the second set of locations compared to the first.
For (17) to be satisfied, we therefore must have p2 > p1.
(iii) Consider the left-hand side of equation (9), which represents ∂Πj∂pj for firm j. For
convenience, let j = l in what follows. Differentiating once again with respect to pL and




















Now, using the fact that qF (y) = 1− qL(y), so that qL(y) + qF (y) = 1, we can write the last
















qL(y)qF (y)(qL(y)− qF (y))dy.
Define q̂(y) = qL(y)qF (y). Now, from part (i), symmetry implies that the solution to
the best response conditions (9) satisfies p∗L = p
∗
F . Since locations are symmetric about the
market center, and prices are equal, at any points y ∈ [0, 1] and z = 1 − y, it follows that









qL(y)qF (y)(qL(y)− qF (y))dy = 0.
Therefore, when locations are symmetric, evaluating the second partial derivative of
29












Hence, the second-order condition for profit maximization is satisfied for L. A similar
analysis shows that the condition is satisfied for F .
Proof of Proposition 3
Since symmetric locations imply equal prices by Proposition 2 part (i), let (x∗L, 1 −
x∗L, p
∗, p∗) denote the equilibrium locations and prices in the sequential game. Suppose for
contradiction that these locations and prices do not constitute an equilibrium in the simulta-
neous game. Then, given that firm L is located at x∗L, the best response of F in the simulta-




∗, p∗). But then, in the sequential game as well, when L locates at x∗L, firm F
should locate at xFx′ rather than at x∗L, contradicting the assumption that (x
∗
L, 1−x∗L, p∗, p∗)
constitutes an equilibrium outcome of the sequential game.
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